The eruption of Social Capital as a concept in the 1990’s and its implications for economic development has not been accompanied with the emergence of practical, as well as scientifically valid measuring instruments. The measurements would help weigh policy alternatives and help in the design of interventions and the evaluation of their implementation. This article (note1) will describe a full cycle of nation-wide measurements of Social Capital (SC) in Colombia, as well as the design of policies and programs and their evaluation in Bogotá, all directed to increase SC. Such an ambitious project will simultaneously be discussed as directed to generate a society-wide dialogue on SC and the ever present limitations of implementation.

1. The design of the Barometer of Social Capital (BARCAS)

In 1991 a new Constitution was issued in Colombia. There sovereignty was shifted towards the People, and the regime was defined as a participatory democracy. Putman’s foundational work (1993) reached a new consulting body in which civil society was constitutionally represented: the National Planning Council. The Council recommended that SC development be introduced as a goal in the National Development Plan. As a by product of such recommendation, the National Planning Office gave the author the task of measuring SC in Colombia.

From the inception of SC research, Coleman (1988) stated the need to unpack the concept and discover its components and their position in the social organization. He defined SC as a capital which exists in the relationships among actors - people and institutions - that delivers a capacity to produce results in the actors carrying it and to attain results that, without it, they could not have achieved. But in Putnam’s work (1993), in which SC was fused with participation in voluntary organizations, Coleman’s advise was not heeded, and most SC research since then has focused on this dimension, out of the many
that could compose SC. This problem reflects the absence of a complex indicator, a number, a score that would be the operational measurement of SC and could thus help study SC’s components and causes.

**Premises used for the development of an instrument to measure SC**

The following are some of the elements deemed necessary for the instrument that would measure SC, and the explanation of how they were incorporated in the Barómetro del Capital Social: Barcas.

To begin, the usual review of the literature identified 69 possible variables that could be included in a measurement; these were aggregated into 10 dimensions. However, the validation process of the instrument should establish empirically which one of those variables and dimensions do indeed make a contribution to SC. This was achieved through several cycles of statistical regressions and factor analysis, first in a pretest, and then three times with data from a national sample.

Second, it was necessary that the instrument could measure a wide variety of social formations, especially because Putnam (1993) had seen that in Italy the regions with the lowest SC had been characterized as Amoral Familist (Banfield 1958). Putnam stated that he had not found Gemeinschaft (community -Tönnies 1957) in Italy, a social formation which could still survive in Colombia’s pre-modern and varied aboriginal communities. To assure this wide range of social formations the following “Quadrant Analysis” was used.

The quadrant model (Figure 1) has in one axis positive and negative “Community Effectiveness" reflecting community ties that allow for cooperative endeavors and, on the second axis, negative and positive Visions of Individualism. For this last axis the positive side is high achievement (McClelland 1967). The two axes give four types of social formations: i) Amoral Familialist (Banfield 1958); ii) High Achievement; iii) Gemeinschaft (Toennies 1957) or Communal and, finally, iv) Gesellschaft, Association or Modern Civic Society. From the classical literature elements for each quadrant were identified and specific items were introduced in the questionnaire to register their presence. The quadrant analysis could be used to trace different development paths and help to consider which were the possible inputs required to reach, for example, the desired fourth quadrant. The most usual route, Gemeinschaft to Amoral Familialist to Achievement to Gesellschaft, implies a long and tortuous process. A more promising
(although theoretically improbable) route from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft could save communities the painful destruction of the community ties that passing through the Amoral Familist stage implies.

![Table of Visions of Individualism]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **AMORAL FAMILIST** (Banfield 1958)
   - Communal deterioration, intermittent individuation
   - Envy (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1961)
   - Images of limited good (Foster 1960)
   - Win-loose images of exploitation, short term benefits, lack of community bonds (Banfield 1958)
   - Mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1964)

2. **ACHIEVEMENT**
   - High Achievement or entrepreneurial capacity (McClelland 1961)
   - Less exploitation
   - Personal gain
   - Individual social mobility
   - Monetary exchange
   - Lack of commitment to community
   - Economic growth

3. **COMMUNAL** or Gemeinschaft (Toennies 1957).
   - Envy, images of limited good and mechanical solidarity (as above)
   - Ritual consumption of surpluses, social exchange of labor (Wolf 1966)
   - High social control by community
   - Diffuse association
   - Little individuation

4. **ASSOCIATION**: “Modern Civic Society” or Gesellschaft (Toennies 1957).
   - Achievement, entrepreneurial capacity
   - Personal effort
   - Win-win based on growth
   - Organic solidarity (Durkheim 1964)
   - Impersonal
   - Universalism (vs. particularism), specific association (Parsons 1951)
   - Growth, high living standards

---

**Figure 1: The different paths of Development**

The Community Individualism Quadrant model

Thirdly, the instrument should take into consideration some fundamental elements of the specific tradition of a society and its relationship to modernization. Here the premises of the Spanish-Catholic-Jacobinism (SCJ) (Merquior 1991, Sudarsky 1992) *(note 2)* were used to identify some problems, especially the fundamental nature of clientelism as the unit of trust (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1981) exchange, and political linkage and the emphasis on hierarchy, mediation, etc. A telling example of this tradition’s expression is the lack of words in Spanish to name Accountability, Lobbying and Constituency.

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The International Scope ® Review, Volume 8 (2006), Issue 13 (Yearly), Sudarsky, 3, © Copyright The Social Capital Foundation, All Rights Reserved
Fourthly, the results should allow a comparison with international results and help to locate Colombia among different countries. For this purpose the survey used the basic World Value Survey (Inglehart 1998) structure with considerable modifications (note 3), an instrument that Putnam (1995) had used to compare the levels of SC in different countries. This structure also helped locate Colombia in the two factors found by Inglehart and used to compare contemporary societies: Survival-Self Expression and Traditional vs. Rational Legal Authority.

Fifthly, the instrument should structure a model that allows policy makers to think and prioritize their goals and interventions. This was achieved, firstly, through the capacity to aggregate-disaggregate dimensions into variables and their constituting items, and to measure their relative effect on SC, and, secondly, through the extensive use of causal modeling with the statistical technique of path analysis.

Sixthly, the instrument should also determine which “containers” in society accumulate SC. This analysis helped determine if civil society, politics, and the state accumulate SC at different territorial levels: barrios, localities, municipalities, departments and nation-wide settings.

Methodology and Procedures

i) A first version of the Barcas, with items coming from different sources (Putnam1993,1995, WVS) and new ones introduced to measure idiosyncratic problems, was applied in a pretest (400 questionnaires) to populations as far apart as possible in terms of their position in the quadrant model.

ii) With this basic data it was possible to validate the capacity of the instrument to measure SC in different social formations, and to compute variables and dimensions and, through factor analysis, produce a first score, our first measurement of SC. From this early stage, beside the SC factor that explained 32% of statistical variance, a new factor appeared which explained an additional 12%. With these results we returned to the questionnaire and redesigned it, scratching items off, redefining variables and dimensions and making sure that all SC’s containers would be measured.

iii) The second version of the Barcas (79 questions, with different formats: yes-no, multiple answers, scales, etc., with each item adapted to a 10 points scale: -0 to 10, -5 to 5 or 0 to -10, depending
iv) These national results were subjected twice to the same procedures applied in step two, and two factor scores were calculated for each respondent. These were used as the dependent variables used to go back and forth to study dimensions, variables, and items, and to determine exactly where each item or variable should go in terms of dimensions. The nature of the second factor was identified as FUSI (Faith in Unvalidated Sources of Information) independently and orthogonally related to SC.

v) With the two scores and the structure of dimensions and variables in a stable state, we proceeded to analyze the results and compare them with results in the questions that appeared both in the WVS and the Barcas. An additional stage implied analysis with aggregated territorial units.

2. Results

The ten dimensions studied

The dimensions that finally emerged, described with the features (and variables) that finally became more related to factors are:

i) Civic participation: active and passive participation in secular voluntary organizations. Religious organizations were excluded for reasons discussed below.

ii) Institutional Trust: trust in a wide variety of institutions.

iii) Solidarity and Mutuality: when people are in trouble, where they can find solidarity or, its polar opposite, be in a state of atomization and social isolation.

iv) Horizontal relationships: social connections and solidarity with family and friends, people that are your equals.
v) **Hierarchy or Vertical Articulation**: trust and memberships in institutions that vertically articulate society such as churches, parties, unions and guilds.

vi) **Social Control**: society's control over the government and the state be it by trust in institutions that exert that control, or knowledge and use of participatory mechanisms used for the same purpose.

vii) **Civic Republicanism**: the citizen responsible of the public sphere, politically educated and politicized, all this as polar opposites to particularism and clientelism.

viii) **Political Participation**: political skills, voting and knowledge and use of participatory mechanisms and representative democracy (legislative linkage).

ix) **Information and transparency (Infotrans)**: statements about the quality and opportunity of information from different sources.

x) **Media**: trust in the press and TV and actions towards them (e.g. writing a letter to the editor, etc.)

*The second factor: Faith in Unvalidated Sources of Information (FUSI)*

SC is the first factor. The interpretation of the second factor can be extracted from figure 2. This table results from making a stepwise regression of all items with FUSI as dependent variable (note 4). FUSI entails a faith in certain sources of information, be they media, the state, or TV, and a positive statement on the quality of the information that citizens have about the problems of the country or the information they need to participate.

A second block of items indicate distinct statements of social isolation and atomization (no meeting with people at work, zero legislative linkage, and no help from your friends). This indicates that people high in FUSI do not have the social contacts necessary to validate whether some information is "real" in the sense that Berger and Luckmann's (1967) use, that is, "reality" is socially constructed and validated through contact with relevant reference groups.

In a third negative block it is possible to identify social contacts that diminish FUSI in a more powerful way, such as voting for the chamber of representatives, belonging to a voluntary educational organization or a political party. Finally, with this meaning of the factor it is possible
to identify elements that are just FUSI: i.e. Trust in the departmental government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Beta with FUSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The communications media do explain in depth problems (item from Infotrans dimension)</td>
<td>.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have someone that explains to them public problems (Infotrans)</td>
<td>.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state makes efforts to keep citizens informed (Infotrans)</td>
<td>.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombians do not know where the country is headed because no one tells us (Infotrans)</td>
<td>-.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens inform themselves appropriately to participate effectively (Infotrans)</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in TV (Institutional Trust, Social Control and Media)</td>
<td>.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason not to participate more: I do not get the necessary information (Infotrans) (people state that they do get the information)</td>
<td>-.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never has a social meeting with people from work (Atomization)</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Legislative Linkage (Atomization)</td>
<td>.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You can expect help from your friends (Horizontal Solidarity)</td>
<td>-.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you vote in the past elections for Chamber of Representatives?</td>
<td>-.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Voting)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Voluntary Organization</td>
<td>-.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party or Group Voluntary Organization (Civic Participation and Hierarchy)</td>
<td>-.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Departmental Government (Institutional Trust)</td>
<td>.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Regression of FUSI by all Items

The relationship of SC and FUSI with the dimensions

Once you have the factor scores calculated by the regression method, you’ll have the scores that we’ve been looking for. To start the analysis we will study how the final ten dimensions are related to SC and FUSI (Figure 3). However, in a second step the dimensions can be decomposed in variables or, eventually, items. In this way it is possible to study with greater precision the components of a specific dimension. The results of these processes are summarized below.

1) Social Control is the dimension with the greatest effect on SC as well as its variable Trust in Institutions that Control the State (more precisely, Government). 2) Hierarchy has an important effect on SC as an aggregate dimension; none of its variables have such effect independently. 3) Civic Republicanism has a positive influence on
both factors, although its effect on SC is through Citizen’s Politicization and Political Education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Beta Ksocial</th>
<th>Beta FUSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Control</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy or Vertical Articulation</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Republicanism</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Trust</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Participation</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>-0.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutuality and Solidarity</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal Relationships</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Transparency</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total explained variance</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3: Regression Coefficients of Dimensions on SC and FUSI*

The item “Media explains problems in depth,” which is part of this last variable, has a positive effect on FUSI. 4) Media has influence on both factors. As variables, Media Activities (Writing to the editor, calling a live program, reading newspaper) is related to SC and Media Trust (on TV and the Press) to FUSI. 5) Institutional Trust has a positive effect on both factors. As variables, Trust in Government is associated with FUSI; later this relationship was isolated to already mentioned Trust in Departmental Government.

The following dimensions have the normatively desirable effect of increasing SC and diminishing FUSI: 6) Political Participation through its variable Political Skill, which has the same dual effect. Voting only diminishes FUSI. 7) Civic Participation has the positive-negative pattern only through the variable Participation in secular organizations. 8) Mutuality and Reciprocity have the pattern just described; its variable Atomization has the opposite effect. 9) Horizontal Relationship had a positive effect on SC and a negative one on FUSI through the Horizontal Solidarity variable. Finally, 10) the main effect on FUSI was...
related to Information and Transparency. Most of its items have an effect on this factor.

A next step is to study the effect that several exogenous and demographic variables have in the factors. Education has the strongest effect, increasing SC and diminishing FUSI. Some regions, among them Bogotá, had a negative effect on SC and positive on FUSI. In this particular instance the negative effect of Bogotá and a similar pattern given by urban (vs. rural) residence were compensated by higher levels of education in Bogotá and in the urban regions.

**Colombia in the factors**

Once we have an equation with which we can compute SC and FUSI we can see the level of Colombia in these dimensions, variables and critical items. To give a general background, when compared with other countries, Colombia appeared very low in a usual proxy of SC: Interpersonal trust. On the other hand, Colombia had a very high level in perception of corruption so, whatever SC we found was in very low range level. Other important findings dimension by dimension are: Firstly, the negative implications of low levels of Social Control given its capacity to produce SC. In the Latin-American tradition the public sphere was “state centered” and there was no recognition of civic society. In social control some of the institutions that were supposed to control the state or the government (parties and congress) received the lowest levels of trust among institutions and in international comparisons. By comparison trust in the Attorney General’s Office, a relatively new institution, had the greatest effect on social capital. Two variables of this dimension where so weak that they had no effect on social capital: Knowledge and use of participatory mechanisms to control the State were for practical purpose unknown in 1997- just few years after the 1991 constitution. Another variable: Accountability has structural institutional constraints that precluded the possibility of its practice by citizens. This problem is related to the structure of parties and the diffuse territorial nature of electoral districts, where citizens have no way of knowing who their representative is.

The Hierarchy or vertical articulation dimension is related to how center-periphery organizations are structured. The organizations (parties, unions, and interest groups) have low membership and trust. The Church, high in both, did not contribute to social capital, as discussed below. The classic social democrat model, an alternative to clientelism based on strong hierarchies of unions and employer’s associations, proved socially unfeasible in Colombia as it covered the
The smallest population (15% of both hierarchies added) of all the countries measured in the WVS. All this implies that the problem of governance is critical in a country so regionally fragmented. It also contradicts Putnam’s (2000) statement that these tertiary organizations are not a source of SC.

Confirming the effect of SCJ tradition, civic society was found weak and not secularized. When compared with other countries, the ratio of active participation in 8 secular voluntary organizations over nine organization that included the religious ones (85% of Colombians over 18 years of age stated that they were Catholics), a ratio that indicates the level of secularization of civil society, Colombia was second only to Nigeria and above South Africa. This problem was compounded with the fact that participation in religious organizations did not contribute to social capital (vis-à-vis Putnam’s 1993 negative relationship by which the more you go to mass the less you participate in civic organizations). This lack of secularization is reflected in the low level of rational legal values shown in the WVS. An additional problem is the number of people (43% of the population over 18 years old) which do not belong to any secular organization. This is an indication of Atomization, the polar opposite of Solidarity and Mutuality. Here, however, the most critical cases were when people belong to no organization at all, be it secular or religious. The great chasm of low participation in secular organizations and high atomization is in the urban lower strata.

In the Political Participation dimension, political skills required for political effectiveness were strongly related to education, a point to be highlighted latter when the cognitive mobilization hypothesis is discussed. Voting lowered FUSI. But the most important finding was that representative and participatory democracies where not related. This had to do with a low level of knowledge and use of participatory mechanism and the lack of linkage (Lawson, 1980) with legislative representatives.

To measure such linkage questions were asked about voting, knowing who the candidate was, if he or she was elected, and, finally, which of the representatives for the five territorial chambers where votes could be cast was the one that represented the respondent in a better way. The critical result was that 53% of the population had no legislative linkage at all, a critical variable that raises FUSI and Atomization. To the question of who represents you in a better way, the percentage of positive responses was very low, especially at the departmental electoral districts (between municipal and national): just between 2
and 3% of the population knew who they were. These electoral districts, as will be seen ahead when the reservoirs of social capital and FUSI are studied, was the “black hole” of social capital. Even worst, as mentioned above, those who trusted the departmental government were high in FUSI. On the other hand, Legislative linkage was even lower in Bogotá, with no Department council to elect and a legislative linkage to the city council lower than the lowest cases at national level. These problems became the subject of interventions in Bogotá, to be described below.

The results confirmed Terry Clark’s (1994) hypothesis that the polar opposite of particularism and clientelism is Civic Republicanism, defined as citizens responsible for the public realm. This important result was tempered with the fact that civic republicanism raised simultaneously both SC and FUSI. The search for the underlying explanation of such effect leads to the cognitive mobilization threshold. This widely discussed mobilization (Clark 1998, Inglehart 1998) posses the need for the cognitive mobilization of citizens to understand modern society. The trigger found for this mobilization was education, and the threshold required for FUSI to drop was complete secondary education. In Colombia only 31% of the population over 20 years reaches that level. Besides providing citizens with high school in the long run, what can be done for the remaining 69% of the population? The answer is participatory planning. This process has to be seen as an alternative mechanism for cognitive mobilization for those citizens who did not reach the threshold of secondary education.

After establishing the composition and strength of each of the elements of social capital and FUSI, it was necessary to detect which social containers, both territorial and transversal, could accumulate each factor. It was found that civil society was the reservoir that held more social capital, compared to the state, politics, and society in general. However, in civil society no territory above the neighborhood accumulates social capital.

Finally, Putnam’s well known conclusion “strong society, strong economy; strong society, effective state” was considered. However, no historical measurement of the strength of civic participation was available. The same happened with measurements of state effectiveness. The only possible analysis was to do some statistical exercises where different causalities between economical development and SC and FUSI were assumed. In these analyses education was also included, which is something Putnam did not do.
When we tried to find out if some factors could cause economic development, it was established that factors did not have any effect on economic development (measured as municipal compounded economic growth for a 25 year period). However, Civic Participation (Putnam’s measurement of social capital), Media and Institutional Trust do have a positive effect. In the other hand, political participation as we measured has a negative effect. With causality going from economic development to the factors it was found that economic development destroys social capital, but education increases it. There is a race between economic development and educational coverage so SC can be maintained. The same pattern of effects was found on Civic Participation, Social Control, Political Participation, and Hierarchy. With FUSI the effect is the opposite.

Even with the methodological limitations, it seems that the relationships with economic development are more complex so it is important to register forces that destroy social capital. This process had explicitly been addressed with the Quadrant Analysis when the modernization process destroyed Gemeinschaft to go either into the quadrants of Amoral Familist, Achievement and eventually into Gesellschaft and the Modern Civic Society. Indeed, the amount and composition of social capitals varied in each quadrant, with a mix of different dimensions and levels for each one of them: Destruction, growth and transformation of social capital. But, what about Putnam’s equation? Though we could not separate the relationships between education and social capital, the results in the quadrant analysis show that, when social capital and positive individualism mix, and the level of education is significantly higher, the compounded economic growth rates are considerably higher and reach levels that can be considered sustainable (note 5).

*From research to practice: Is it possible to expedite Bogotá’s transit to Modern Civic Society?*

The quadrant model permitted the search for an “intervention unit” that could be used to transform the traditional clientelist culture prevalent in Colombia into a Modern Civic Society. Bogotá appeared in the limit between quadrants of Achievement and Gesellschaft. Additionally, it showed strong signals of a new citizenship: the highest level of civic republicanisim among the municipalities measured the lowest clientelism and a higher level of education that assured a greater number of citizens cognitively mobilized. Although it is possible to argue about the emergence of a “civic culture” in the other quadrants, a city-wide intervention that could be used as a model is
easier to implement when you have the requisites of civic republicanism and cognitive mobilization.

3. The city of Bogotá interventions to change political culture and the creation of localities as containers that can accumulate SC

In 2001, Antanas Mockus was elected Bogotá’s Mayor for the second time. In his first mayoralty (1995-1997) he had run with a platform based on Cultura ciudadana. Since then, he had emphasized “appreciative communications” reflected in one of his dictums: To build upon was has been built, to highlight good results so they could become an example to follow, etc. In his second term (2001-2003) the emphasis on cultural change was geared towards Democratic Culture. Although Mayor Mockus is better known for his reduction of crime and mortality rates in Bogotá, here I will focus on the translation of the analytical tools of SC diagnosis to the implementation of a decentralization process from the city towards localities (Sudarsky 2003), and the construction of them as containers of SC (note 6). This was made possible by several legal innovations, among them, firstly, the constitutional extension of the Planning Councils, in which representatives of different interests convened into a council to form an opinion and made recommendations for the development plans of different cities and departments; secondly, the Estatuto de Bogotá put through by President Gaviria after the constitutional process gave the city an institutional framework that drastically separated the executive and the legislative bodies in the running of city affairs and, finally, the City Council’s Acuerdo 13, that allowed the creation of Local Planning Councils (LPC) that would help organize a participatory process in which the allocation of the local investment plan could be agreed with the local mayors. Also, the creation of 107 UPZs (Zonal Planning Units) played an important role. These units required planning above the 5,000 or so barrios and below the 20 localities. Figure 4 illustrates how the decentralization process towards the localities was conceptualized and interventions designed.

To socially, politically and administratively strengthen the localities, the municipal institutions had, in the first place, to exert a distributed and redundant control over the local government, which was done mostly with the creation of local “government cabinets” in which the most relevant municipal institutions for each locality had representatives in its local government. On the other hand, through the process of participatory planning, civil society would agree with the local mayor
about their preferences for the local investment plan that would operate for the next three years, and, during this period, would exert the powerful, SC producing, social control over the local government.

Requisites for Decentralization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political bodies</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council: Concejales</td>
<td>Municipal Administration</td>
<td>Central Level:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distributed and Redundant Control</td>
<td>• Local Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by City level institutions</td>
<td>• Identification of Territorial Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Administrative Board: Ediles</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Control of Local Plans and Budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Local Mayor’s Jurisdiction:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Administrative Restructuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Control</td>
<td>Civil Society Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Society’s Organizations</td>
<td>(Acuerdo 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Local Planning Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Clarification of Representation at City and Local Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Measurement of Density and Articulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: the construction of Localities as containers of SC

The most relevant interventions that will be described here are:

i) The participatory planning process institutionalized by the Acuerdo 13, which should cognitively mobilize and diminish FUSI in the lower strata of Bogotá.

ii) The construction of Political Maps to clarify the representation of localities in the City Council, which should increase accountability and legislative linkage.

iii) The formulation of a constitutional reform to create single seat electoral systems. This would have an effect equal to the one just mentioned.

iv) The measurement of Density and Articulation of local civic society 2001-2003 to provide instruments to increase civic participation and vertical articulation.

I will describe some basic elements of each and some critical analytical requirements for the interventions’ effectiveness.
Participatory Planning in Bogotá

In Bogotá local governments have discretion over how to spend 10% of the current income of the city’s government, which amounts to a significant 30% of available discretionary funds not legally pledged mostly to health and education. Each locality receives resources according to its population below the poverty line and some efficiency criteria. The project’s objective was to mobilize the population to participate in the process and raise Colombia’s very low legal rational authority levels (factor of the WVS), which are easily comparable to, for example, Tanzania. To generate collective rationality it is necessary that the population at large face the complex dilemmas that limited resources impose on choice of what to fund and what not to fund. The total amounts of these resources were made explicit to the participants from the very beginning to the participating groups and to the LPC. According to the municipal plan’s goals – i.e. citizen’s culture, productivity, social justice, education, family, and environment-, task groups were formed at the local and zonal levels. With the blueprint of the outgoing local mayor plan’s, people then express their preferences with regard to the mix of investments. The technical units that usually filtered the project at the very end of a long process of approval, were now mobilized to train the members of the specialized task groups so that these participants would know what projects were in the process of implementation, which were in the planning phase, so they would develop a “number sense” of what certain initiatives would cost.

The main thrust of the planning process is to order and aggregate projects, and continuously quantify them, adding them up both at the main goal level and then in their local mix of goals investments. This was done at the initial local citizen’s encounter, then at the zonal level, then in a joint meeting with the local mayor with the LPC. In a final citizen’s meeting the mix was again modified and concerted with the mayor. Later he presented a new investment mix to the LPC to be adjusted. The local Ediles (alderman) then approved the plan. The Municipal Planning Office controlled the yearly local budgets so that they would be consistent with the investment plans. In this way the previously given “Common Good” is forged by explicitly differentiated and represented interests.

The level of readiness and how deep each locality was able to advance in the process had great variations in what was called a “Community capacity learning scale.” Some communities only aggregated the demands and thought their responsibility ended just
there, leaving decisions to the government and the Ediles; other localities were able to identify projects and ordered them according to their importance; some others could include projects that had not been even initially listed at the municipal level. But the level of awareness of the members of the localities and their collective rationality was significantly increased and people started to see themselves in a territory that had not been collectively understood before.

This was done in the first six months of the mayor’s period (Escallón & Sudarsky 2001). At the end of the first year, the City Mayor had an Accountability Citizen’s Encounters at each of the localities. One of the important elements at these encounters was a “Tax pedagogy” process by which the redistributive effects of municipal taxes (50% of income was invested in redistribution services) was explained to people of lower incomes. There was a peculiar paradox: the people that received more resources were the greatest opponents to tax increases that would directly benefit them (for one peso they contributed, they received one hundred). The realization that resources had to come from somewhere gained a lot from the process of participatory planning and the sense of limited resources. The clientelist inducement particularizes the solution of a problem at the individual level: “your” scholarship, the pavement of “your” street, so that there is never the need for neither collective solutions nor the necessity to choose the origin of the investments for collective problems. With regard to this, the Mayor made the decision of trying to universalize some services, so that people did not have to subject themselves to selling their vote in exchange of the fulfillment of some basic needs. As a separate process, city wide investment was territorialized so people would know what was going to be invested in each locality and UPZ.

**Focusing Representation: Political Maps**

Once the Participatory Planning process was advanced, a new set of problems appeared. The most conspicuous was the relationship between participatory and representative democracies. As was mentioned above, there is no connection among them. There was no way to establish the city council members’ accountability, since they are elected for the total city in a “proportional representation system.” This was worsened by the use of a larger remainder system of quotients and residuals with no minimal number of votes required to be counted (threshold). Parties had splintered into personal movements in which a city councilman was elected with a very small number of votes, very
close to a personal clientele. This was reflected in Bogotá’s City Council’s lower legislative linkage in comparison with the already low levels in the rest of the country. So, to specify the representation that local citizens should expect from city councilors, Political Maps were elaborated and presented at the Local Citizens’ Encounters.

The political maps were elaborated according to two criteria: the importance of the locality for the elected councilors in terms of the percentage of votes that each locality had for each councilman, and, secondly, the importance that each councilor had for each locality. For the first case, a ranking was made for each councilor of the number of votes they had received in each locality. Thus, the electoral importance of the locality was established for the councilor. For the second criteria, a ranking was made for each locality based on the number of votes each councilor had received from the locality. In this way it was known how important the councilor was for the locality. Then, the two criteria were matched, so that when the two interests were present -the locality was important to the councilor, and the councilor was important for the locality- a strong linkage was established. There were strong, weak and non existing linkages. Some councilors did not have linkage with any locality, and some localities, because of the dispersion of their votes, was not important to any councilman.

The map was later used for the first time to publicly establish the relationship between a councilor’s political decisions and his territorial basis. When a tax reform was being discussed at the fiscal commission of the city council, the yes or no of each member were independently matched with the effect that it would have in terms of the social programs that would be suspended -remember that investment had been territorialized-. It became evident that several of the councilors were voting against the interest of the localities they should be representing. The results were published in an important newspaper and the reforms sailed through. Some accountability and legislative linkage had been established.

**Legislative Linkage: The proposal of single seat Electoral Districts**

As has been highlighted, the lack of legislative linkage and the unfeasibility of establishing the accountability of the representatives are structurally based on an electoral system elaborated at department-wide or city-wide electoral districts, the “black holes” of SC. The proportional representation system, the largest remainder system without a minimum number of votes for a list (threshold) not
only creates incentives to divide parties, but even punishes those that receive a large number of votes. The wider discussion of this matter is beyond the scope of this article (see for example Farrell 1997), so I’ll concentrate on the proposal, the dynamics of its circulation in the national legislative process, and the implication that these have for the “third wave of democracy” (note 7).

The proposal emerged during the discussion of Bogotá’s political reform. Initially it was a debate about the election of the councilors, but it ended up as a proposal for the election of members of the Chamber of Representatives. We proceeded to divide Bogotá into districts of 250,000 residents. Through the amalgamation of contiguous localities, UPZs or Barrios, twenty nine districts were drawn. In each one, parties would register its candidate (registering more than one would divide its electorate), and the winner would be the one with the larger number of votes in the district and would become its only and clear representative. If the elected person resigned, new elections would be held, thus avoiding the deleterious practice of list members taking turns at a seat, without the electorate knowing who they had actually elected. The representation would be clear and the citizens would follow their representative’s decisions in the elected body and, more importantly, they would demand an explanation of the reasons for any such decision (valid information.) Parties would probably be created by democratically selected candidates in local political clubs, and they would have to clarify their programs and be accountable for them. In this new electoral district the lower strata would have a reason to vote: today their voting turnout proportional to their population is only 25% of the upper strata’s. The correspondence of the political process with a certain territory would create a new container for the accumulation of SC.

In 2002 the process of electoral reform surrounding the Referendum posed by President Álvaro Uribe, the parliament took the initiative to preempt the electorate with a political reform of their own making. This process led to the introduction of a threshold of the number of votes for a party’s election, average vote allotment (cifra repartidora), and preferential vote. This reform indeed strengthens parties and eliminates independent political entrepreneurs. Although in this legislature there were other projects to reintroduce the provincial electoral districts, (sub departmental level) they were expeditiously cast aside. It is imperative for the legislative members that no public identification of their constituency are made: representation without accountability.
The Referendo had another relevant point for my argument: the discussion of the budget in “Community Councils”. The proposal initially presented by the government was that it would meet with ambiguously convened councils of civil society to establish the priority of regional investment budgets (something similar to what the Local Planning Councils did with the investment plan). When this proposal arrived to the legislature they abrogated themselves the right to control and decide the whole of the budget, line by line, and destroyed the strongly fought reform for a strict division of powers with the executive branch. It also made them the indispensable mediators of civil society. But, alas, only another question of the Referendum was approved by popular vote.

Density and articulation of local civic society

Returning to figure 4, a strong civic society is necessary to exert social control. But, how strong must it be so as to be able to exert its responsibilities? Although the BARCAS and the WVS measurements make the comparison of civic participation both nationally and internationally possible, the process of increasing membership in those organizations has to start from the bottom up with the strengthening of civil society. Otherwise the temptation for a state corporatist mobilization presents a great risk. For this purpose, and to facilitate the diagnosis of civic participation at the local level and to return these results to the common functional interests and local organizations, density and articulation of civil society were measured (Sudarsky 2003). Density, both passive and active, was defined as the degree in which members of a locality belong to secular voluntary organizations, or, on the negative side, the percentage of people that do not belong to any organization, be they secular or religious (Atomization). Articulation is the degree in which public organizations are, firstly, linked with one another (horizontal) or, secondly, to (vertical): (a) organizations of greater territorial coverage and (b) participate in the process of local planning. The results of these measurements were organized so as to be retuned to workshops in each locality (Sudarsky 2003). It was repeated in 2003, and comparative results were processed after Luis Eduardo Garzón, Bogotá’s new mayor, came into power.

I will present the general tendency in Density from 1997 to 2001 to 2003 and some important out layers from this tendency, one in the cultural sector and one in the locality of Antonio Nariño.
The average Density for 18 year olds and over-all for secular organizations, (rating 0 for no membership, 5 for passive membership and 10 for active) dropped from 12.8% in 1997 to 7.7% in 2001 and again to 4.7% in 2003, a drastic fall. Parties, a basically rural institution, showed the highest drop in membership. In the period from 2001 to 2003 membership in religious organizations had the greatest fall, mainly by the loss of active membership. Given the availability of an (1997) equation for social capital, the loss of civic participation from 1997-2001 had a net effect of decreasing the SC of Bogotá in 10%, a 2.4% annual loss.

The membership drop in civic organizations has been registered by Putnam (2000) and Skocpol (2003) for the US case, a drop attributed to urban sprawl, the inception of television and generational change in Putnam’s case, and professionalization of the public space via NGOs in Skocpol’s interpretation, a debate beyond the scope of this article. However, the discussion of the out layers now becomes important, especially regarding the identification of successful cases and their positive recognition.

The locality of Antonio Nariño

Most localities experienced a drop both in Density and Articulation. However, Antonio Nariño showed a massive improvement. There the two times local mayor organized several cooperatives of small shoe manufacturers that sold “back to school” packages to low income students, exported shoes, and organized local commerce in an “open skies shopping center.” It created over 6,000 new jobs. Memberships in cooperatives rose from 2.5% in 2001 to 5.0% in 2003. Active participation rose from 0.8% to 2.1%. The associability thus created spilled to other sectors. Membership in secular organizations rose 148%, with a tenfold increase in cultural organizations, five times in charity and health, 3 times in women’s groups, and two times in guilds and unions. The aggregated active participation rose 80%. There was a 33% increase in horizontal articulation, and 50% in vertical articulation. Although the speech about civil society had been made to all local majors, only this one had shown the leadership to promote it.

The cultural sector

The Cultural sector, mostly comprised by artistic and cultural voluntary organizations, was the organization that had the lowest drop in density and one of the highest levels of articulation. Active Membership dropped only 9%, though the non active grew 13% to maintain a
stable density. Why is this result so important? Because in just three year the negative trend running from 1997 to 2001 was stopped. The cultural sector diminished the average monthly rate of loss in density more than other organizations, that is, the speed at which membership was being lost was stopped. What happened? The Cultural sector was the only sector that articulated a systemic and participatory process from the local to the municipal level to decide and allocate resources, replacing the previous mechanism in the hands of notables. This event highlights an element identified by Eisenstadt (2003), who emphasizes the “strong and highly sensitized state’s” institutional offer for participation, contrasting the negative example of Poland during the XVIII century, where civil society was directed to extracting resources from the state, and the positive of England in the XIX century, with its active political clubs. The search for this institutional framework, which Avritzer (2002) discusses and this case illustrates, shows that civic mobilization without a coherent institutional offer from the state just leads to disappointment. For these reason, a watchful eye must be kept on projects like the one in the Referendo and the balanced relationship between participatory and representative democracy.

4. Discussion and conclusion

The promoting of social capital has a wide range of advocates. However, there is a wide gap between this advocacy and the creation of a system for its effective growth. The Barcas is an example of what could be achieved with an adequate instrument that can measure social capital and its complexity in different social formations. We were able to address this issue through the use of the Quadrant Model and the complexity and precision that the Barcas achieves by des-aggregation of dimensions, variables, and items. The identification of reservoirs that accumulate SC and FUSI increased the analytic results and pinpoints structural constrains for SC accumulation. The Barcas gives a clinical and fine grained picture of the SC of a specific social formation. It also carries a great comparability and standardization of these measures. However, it is important to keep in mind the society’s specific traditions and their consequences for the institutional structures were SC is to be promoted. In this sense, measurement instruments must be country-specific, but must strive for cross country commonalities. With these considerations, the Barcas provides great precision to find out what the target of our interventions should be. There certainly are anthropological methods that are more
precise, but require highly skilled researchers and their results can easily become a collection of case studies with little comparability. The Barcas model leads policy makers to think about what they should do, and leads scientists to the discovery of unexpected and not self evident results, i.e. the black hole of SC, FUSI, the cognitive mobilization educational threshold, etc.

With the analytical and empirical map it builds, and a privileged position to design city wide strategies, we proceeded in Bogotá with the project described above. I consider the parallel research and implementation successful in several ways. Firstly, the information system that emerged was able to detect some illuminating changes (Antonio Nariño, Cultural sector), and identify what was not achieved, and thus create reasonable expectations of what can be achieved. For example, it shows the slowing down of the depletion of memberships in the cultural sector. However, there were many questions that could not be answered because in that measurement the Barcas was not applied in its totality, so the impact of policies could only be measured in civic participation, and changes in other dimensions, such as social control, institutional trusts, etc., where Participatory Planning and other interventions could have an impact, were not measured. The measurement of all dimensions is a must.

Another source of reflection is the sustainability of these interventions and policies: There is nothing sustainable about them. As a matter of fact, it is almost certain that they would be scratched in the following administrations (Sudarsky 1980, Hirschman 1975). The search for a permanent carrier, a role that at times is ascribed to civil society, is one of the eventual virtuous cycles we are trying to build. Avritzer correctly identifies such structures as something still waiting to be institutionalized. I hope that with SC as a paradigm many policies will converge sooner or later. But we are facing some brick wall strong traditions that have to be contested.

The Barcas should help create a consensus on the outcomes of SC promotion. I also hope that in public and scientific spheres in which the practice of promotion of social capital in relatively wide contexts is common can use this cycle, from measurement to evaluation, as an example from which to learn.
5. Endnotes

1. This article is based in two presentations delivered in the Second International Conference of The Social Capital Foundation, Malta, September 20-23, 2005.

2. The symbolic structure built through the centuries of Spanish domination forged during the Counterreformation and the Hapsburg domination of Latin America has to be seen as a matrix in the Levi-Strauss’ symbolic structuralist approach, which determines the region’s particular form of modernization and its emerging institutional arrangements in a way generally specified by Eisenstadt (1978, 27). Some of the elements of such matrix in the Latin American case are: a) The assumption that life in society is based on consensus instead of contract; b) society seen as monistic and organic with preference for the political and state spheres, to the detriment of civil society; c) hierarchical and unequal; d) the absence of autonomous access to the Center with consequences for e) the need for mediation; f) instead of a systematic and universalistic conception of norms and laws, they are applied in a particularistic and ad-hoc manner; g) a compulsion to participate without a resulting commitment to the social order; h) the weakness of limits between collectivities, with their corresponding diffuse and permeable membership; i) the social order as “given” instead of as constructed; j) notions of redistributive justice and cooptation; k) emphasis in the Common Good instead of the Good of the Majority; l) an external relationship between Center and Periphery which allows that regional power structures, essentially based in real and symbolic kinships, can exert their local arrangements.

3. The Barcas applied in the second national measurement (2005) has been modified to include the WVS more extensively with the hope of calculating SC from at least 95 countries where the WVS is simultaneously applied.

4. The general criteria of inclusion in a regression was, for example, if a dimension was under analysis, the variable tested for inclusion would add at least 1% of explained variance and its standardized regression coefficient (beta) would be larger than 0.05.

5. As it can be observed when social capital and achievement mix in the fourth quadrant, the ten years economic growth increases 20 additional points over the plain Achievement quadrant, 24 points over just communal social capital and double over the absence of both social capital and Achievement in the Amoral Familist quadrant. The contribution of pure Achievement is much smaller. Educational differences also play an important role.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant</th>
<th>Municipal Gross Product yearly growth rate</th>
<th>Growth: 10 years</th>
<th>Educational level (Average years of study)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amoral Familist</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>6.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Bogotá, a seven million city, is divided in 20 localities that range from 50,000 inhabitants to a million.

7. These processes have to be seen as a part of what Avritzer (2002) calls “the third wave of democracy”, an analysis based on the relationship between the mobilization of society and its institutionalization, and the shift away from the “minimalist and elitist” politics of the second wave, in which citizens only elect representatives and the executive power, who then take care of governing. He states that the second wave came after the undifferentiated mobilization of the first wave overwhelmed the political regime, as in the Weimar Republic. In the third wave “citizens can participate in a public space as equals and guide the decisions in the political sphere. Mobilization sees democracy as a set of social practices that are looking for ways to be institutionalized”.

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