The Evolution of Social Capital in Colombia, 1997-2005:
Social Capital, Institutional Trust and Control, and Social Validation of Information
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abstract: The BARCAS, an instrument designed to measure social capital in Colombia produced three factors in its second application: Social Capital (SK), Indirect Control and Trust of Government (Intricate), and Faith in Un-validated sources of Information (Fusi). The ten dimensions measured allowed to determine which ones contributed to the 106% increase in SK, the 100% decrease in Intricate, and the undesirable 133% growth of Fusi. SK growth was due to the increase in the Mutuality and Solidarity and Political Participation dimensions. Intricate fell on account of a loss in Institutional Trust, although this was compensated by the increase of the Social Control dimension. The Fusi increase was related to the rise in the Information and Transparency and Civic Republicanism dimensions, and pointed that the notion of citizens responsible for the public sphere became a civic myth only counteracted by political and civic participation. The latter fell dramatically, even when compared internationally, decreasing Fusi and preventing Social K from reaching a 143% increase. The results are discussed and its causes analyzed in regard to the largest cities in the country, where in several cases Fusi fell in a process akin to cognitive mobilization.

keywords: social capital, Colombia, cognitive mobilization, World Values Survey, civil society, political participation.

Introduction

Following Putnam’s study (1993) of Italian regions, the growth of social capital (SK) as a research subject has been exponential. Putnam showed the importance of social relations for both economic development and institutional effectiveness. More specifically, how the abundance of volunteer organizations (an SK index) explained future economic development better than previous economic
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development. The former had an effect on institutional effectiveness that the latter did not produce. Coleman had already pointed out that SK depends on the specifics of social organizations and that its presence could be detected when the additional capacity to achieve a goal is embedded in relationships among actors, be they individual or institutional. He states, ‘It then becomes a second stage in the analysis to unpack the concept, to discover what components of social organization contribute to the value produced.’ (Coleman, 1988: 8). In other words, the concept had to be unfolded and different relationships examined to see whether they contained SK. Putnam’s emphasis on volunteer organizations, further toughened for subsequent research on American society (2000) and comparative research (Putnam, 1995, 2002) reinforced the notion that SK was contained mainly in volunteer organizations (VO). Many other researchers, however, searched elsewhere for SK and encountered the conceptual and methodological problem of not being able to empirically compare the relative strength, abundance, and simultaneous evolution of SK components. Indeed this problem has conceptual and methodological roots. Among the methodological problems is the absence of a synthetic SK index that could be decomposed and its parts studied, that is, a reliable dependent variable that could be measured on contrasting social formations at different times, to allow examining the effect of different exogenous variables on SK.

This article is devoted to an effort in Colombia to design an SK index for examining the contribution of various dimensions to SK and the quantification of their evolution and change by means of a factor analysis of the results of measurements performed in 1997 and 2005. The instrument developed for the purpose is the Barometer of Social Capital (BARCAS, by its Spanish acronym). After a brief description of the Colombian context and several critical events that occurred between its two applications, the procedures used in applying BARCAS in a first survey and a brief summary of results (Sudarsky, 2001, 2006) will be presented. The section following will deal with the methodological procedures of the second application, especially the measurement of change, and the discussion of the appearance of three factors, instead of only the expected SK, and will be followed by the actual results of the change in the factors. Since the results generated a new way of looking at society and SK, the effect of political culture on the advance towards Modern
Civic Society (MCS) will be discussed in the light of the results of the transformation in four Colombian cities. Finally, some additional reflections will be offered.

**The Colombian Context**

Since its beginnings, Colombia has been imbued with the Hispanic-Catholic Jacobinist Tradition (HCJT) (Merquior, 1991; Sudarsky 1992) that consolidated in the Spanish colonial territories, its neo-patrimonial nature (Eisenstadt, 1973: 32-37) leaving patron-client relationships as the basic unit of center-periphery articulation. Not until the 1991 Constitution, which included among its drafters the recently demobilized M-19 leftist group, did new channels of participation and territorial decentralization open.

In the 1930s, a relatively fast and violent process of urbanization began to take place in this largely peasant country. The fact that the emergence of most of the present guerrillas groups coincided with this displacement from the countryside - an instance of Polyani’s (1957) ‘great transformation’ led Hobsbawm (2002: 373) to ponder whether a social and political revolution would not have spared the country from the continuous upheaval in which it has attempted to modernize.

The process, however, was transformed by the inception of drug trafficking during the 1980s, which permeated and attacked an already weak State and empowered drug cartels and paramilitary and guerrilla groups, all of which used the most terrible atrocities as a means to their ends. Some cities, especially Medellin and Cali became home bases for drug cartels.

In 1995, President Samper was accused of receiving campaign money from one of the drug cartels. In the midst of the ensuing scandal, the BARCAS was applied for the first time in 1997.

In 1998, President Pastrana began a new peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the strongest, and seemingly omnipresent, guerrilla group. The FARC used the process to fortify itself and terrorize the country, thus ushering in the election of President Alvaro Uribe on a ticket of Democratic Security.

During Uribe’s first administration, characterized by high economic growth, Colombians were able to shed most of their fears and return to roads and territories. The second BARCAS measurement took place at the end of 2005, just before the parliamentary elections.
In 2005, Congress changed the constitution to enable Uribe’s (successful) 2006 reelection, an event followed by public outrage because many members of Uribe’s coalition in parliament were involved with the paramilitary. Simultaneously, a process of Justicia y Paz (Justice and Peace) led to the demobilization of the main paramilitary organizations and, soon after, the extradition of some of their heads to the USA. The current process of Verdad, Justicia y Reparación, (Truth, Justice and Reparation), was blurred by Uribe’s unsuccessful moves to be reelected for a third term.

The Design of the Barometer of SocialK (BARCAS) and Some Results of the First Measurement (1997)

Since most broad empirical research in SK comes from statistics gathered and surveys performed for other purposes, frequently unavailable in developing countries, a specific instrument for measuring SK had to be designed for this endeavor. An initial review of the literature available at the time (1995) allowed the identification a wide set of dimensions that could describe the variety of SK. Each was composed of a set of variables, and each variable was composed of items to be included in the survey being designed. From the start, whenever theoretical and empirical evidence from initial applications so indicated, some crossover from one dimension to the others was purposefully introduced. In order to measure some of these variables and dimensions for an eventual international comparison of results, the World Values Survey (WVS) was used as a source of questions. However, and since it was necessary to ensure that the questionnaire could be applied to illiterate respondents and that problems of affirmativity, response set and social desirability were minimized, new questions were created to cover contents not included in the WVS. An initial questionnaire was pre-tested in 1996 to externally validate the instrument’s capacity to effectively measure SK in contrasting social formations (the Quadrant Model, not discussed here). Among them were: ‘pre-modern’ indigenous communities (Tonnies, 1957); those with very weak social ties outside the family (Amoral Familist, Banfield, 1958); cities with positive individualism and entrepreneurship (McClelland, 1967) yet low in community ties; and those with the right combination of individualism and collective ties: the Modern Civic Society posed by
Putnam for northern Italy. Following the pretest results, the composition and definition of
dimensions and variables were validated and redrawn.

Some Procedures
The structure based on dimensions, variables and items would eventually allow their
aggregation/disaggregation for greater precision in the diagnosis of a particular social formation.
Each item was re-coded on a 10 point scale and, depending on its polarity, added or subtracted to
create variables scores to be subsequently added to compute dimension scores. For the sake of
parsimony, the criteria for inclusion of an item in a variable was that it added more than 1% of
variance to a stepwise standardized regression of the variable score by its items, and that the beta
coefficient of the item in the regression was larger than 0.05. The same criteria were used for the
variables-dimensions composition. Whenever any theoretical doubt about where a specific variable
or item belonged, factor analysis was used with all the components of a subset of dimensions to
establish where the variables (or items) actually belonged statistically. For example, the Civic
Republicanism dimension and its variables were differentiated from Political Participation in this
way, when initially we thought they belonged to a single dimension.

After the dimensions were refined, a factor analysis of dimensions was performed (Varimax
rotation), and factor scores for each respondent were computed (regression method). These
scores, the long searched dependent variable (i.e., SK individual scores) to be scrutinized, were
again used to further refine dimensions and variables, always maintaining the structure of
dimensions and variables to avoid a ‘fishing expedition’ (although fishing we went) that would
deliver analytically meaningless results or pure statistical artifacts. In other words, when SK scores
were regressed in variables, only the ones belonging to the dimensions previously found to be
significantly related to SK were included. These refining cycles were repeated over six times, first
with the pretest data base and later with the 1997 national sample, despite the fact that the actual
factor composition was stable from the very start. The survey was applied to a nationally
representative sample of 3000 people over 18 years old.
The Dimensions

The final emerging dimensions (some of their variables redesigned for the 2005 application) were the following:

1. **Solidarity and Mutuality** refers to the amount of perceived general solidarity (who can help people when they are in trouble) from different sources or, negatively expressed, its absence: atomization. This last variable is composed of several indices such as not belonging to any VO or not having any type of social security. The dimension also comprises reciprocity and its opposite: opportunism. Together with the two following dimensions, they measure the social fabric nuclear to SK, namely, the vertical, horizontal and general sources of solidarity and their respective modes of solving collective problems.

2. **Hierarchy or Vertical Articulation** comprises membership and trust in organizations that articulate society vertically: churches, guilds, unions, and political parties. Although Olson (1965) considers them an obstacle to development, and Putnam considers their capacity to accumulate SK marginal, their contribution to SK was evident since the very first measurements. This dimension includes center-periphery relation mechanisms different from structural clientelism and the vertical solution of collective problems.

3. **Horizontal Relationships** refers to the SK generated by relationships among equals and peers. It includes horizontal solidarity, horizontal solutions to collective problems, and social activities in work or neighborhood; or, negatively expressed, the need to rely on a third party to enforce agreements and solve problems.

4. **Political Participation** comprises the complete cycle of political negotiation (political skills) and voting, as well as representative and participatory democracies. The former is quantified by the amount and quality of legislative linkage (Lawson, 1980) between voters and their representatives. Here, Colombia shares a weakness with other countries of the HCJT. Executive linkage was also measured. In 1991, a new constitution introduced a large set of participatory mechanisms whose development (knowledge and use of participatory mechanisms) was measured. Included here were those related to direct democracy (i.e., referenda, recalls) and deliberative democracy (i.e.,
participatory planning). A subset of these mechanisms was included in the Social Control dimension. Political parties – membership, trust, and as sources of information – are also part of this dimension.

5. **Civic Participation** is the active or passive membership in secular VOs (also known as the organizational density of civil society), and includes, among other variables, volunteer work. One of the most conspicuous elements of the HCJT is its conception of the public sphere as an exclusive realm of the State, relegating citizen actions to a private arena with no space for civic society, namely, the non-State public sphere.

6. **Media** comprises two elements: activities such as calling live media to participate and writing letters to a newspaper editor (or even reading the newspaper) and the trust placed in newspapers, television, and, in the 2005 application, radio.

7. **Institutional Trust** refers to the trust allotted to a gamut of institutions. Trust in guerrillas and the paramilitary, though not included in the scale, were also measured on a scale that ranged from 0 (none), 3.3 (little), 6.6 (some), to 10 (a lot).

8. **Social Control** is about the control of society over government and was measured to reflect the 1991 constitutional shift from sovereignty of the Nation to sovereignty of the People. It includes, in the first place, the trust allotted to institutions that control the government, for instance, Congress, the Attorney-general’s office, and the Media. Second, the knowledge and utilization of the participatory mechanisms whose specific purpose is the control of government. Third, the amount of accountability, the measurement of whether citizens believe their representatives should be and actually are responsible to their constituency - accountability being a notion explicitly absent from the HCJT, where representatives are only responsible for an abstract ‘common good’.

9. **Civic Republicanism** refers to the active citizen responsible for the public sphere. The initial results empirically confirmed the existence of the polarity established by Clark (1994) for this type of citizenship as the opposite of clientelism and non-ideological particularism. It answers the question of what could replace clientelism, whose constitutive element - patron-client relationships - mixes specific and generalized exchange, that is to say, particularistic, hierarchical and unequal
unconditional solidarity (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1981). It also includes personal responsibility for the public good and political education.

10. **Information and Transparency** concerns the quality and sufficiency of the information received from different sources for exercising citizenship (people have others who explain public problems to them in a clear manner; citizens inform themselves to participate) such as the media (communication media explain problems in depth instead of just gossiping about them), the State (the State makes efforts to maintain citizens informed), and political parties.

The 1997 factor analysis of these dimensions revealed two independent and orthogonal factors: SK proper and a new factor called Faith in Un-validated Sources of Information (Fusi), which together explained 50% of the variance. The new factor, defined to a large extent by the Information and Transparency dimension, implies that people with a high Fusi score believe in the quality and amount of information received, yet simultaneously lack the capacity to socially validate whether the information is 'truthful' in Berger and Luckman's (1966) sense of the word, as opposed to the truthfulness of the physical world. This is explained by the fact that people high in Fusi are socially isolated (atomized) or have not reached the threshold of complete secondary schooling where Fusi starts to fall (Sudarsky, 2001). Reaching this threshold triggers the cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1998) that allows people to understand the complexities of modern society and develop an appropriate critical attitude towards the quality of the information received.

As a general context for the 1997 results, two frequently used proxies for SK were measured. First, interpersonal trust (Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or do you need to be very careful in dealing with people?); in Putnam’s (1995) words, the statement that 'most people can be trusted'. Second, perception of corruption. Both were then available in the WVS, indicating that Colombia’s SK level fell in a very low range, only surpassed in this dubious direction by Brazil.
With the two factors scored for each respondent - our dependent variables - additional procedures were carried out. A factor analysis created independent and orthogonal factors. However, once the factor scores were available, a stepwise standardized regression of all dimensions with the SK and Fusi scores was run using the usual ‘1% additional variance and larger than 0.05 beta coefficient’ criteria to detect which dimensions behave as ‘hinges’ among factors, that is, have an effect on both. The results of these procedures have already been published in English (Sudarsky, 2006), so I will not dwell on them and proceed to the 2005 procedures and results.

**The 2005 Application and the Measurement of Change in the Factors**

**The Modification of the BARCAS**

The second measurement built upon the first national data-base and the understanding it provided. This time, however, the instrument also had to measure the two main WVS factors: traditional-legal and survival-self expression values (Inglehart and Wetzel, 2007), so parsimony was critical to keep the survey in a manageable length for the respondents without losing the explanatory value of dimensions and variables. Thus the 1997 results were studied to identify the items and questions that added explanation to factors and dimensions; those that did not meet the criteria of inclusion were discarded. Nevertheless, some items new to the WVS (i.e., trust in radio) were also added. This new version of the BARCAS was pre-tested on a small sample in 2004 and later applied nationally to a sample consistent with the 1997 one. One indication that the first study was relevant for Colombian society was that large samples (500 or 1,000-person surveys) were financed by city governments (Bogotá and Medellín) or local civil society (Cali and Barranquilla). The measurements allowed establishing baselines for the communes or localities in which the cities are divided, as well as their specific capacity to accumulate SK. The importance of these intermediate territorial or administrative units below the city and above the neighborhood level will become apparent at the end of this article.

**The Three Factors in the 2005 Database - SK, Intricate, and Fusi - and Their Relationships with Dimensions**
The 2005 national database was subject to a factor analysis of the ten dimensions. A third factor appeared: Institutional Trust and Indirect Control of the State - Intricate, increasing total explained variance from 50 to 65%. This additional variance was very important and had to be protected because it entailed a better understanding and measurement of our subject of study. Hence, all relationships between factors and dimension and/or variables and items were performed exclusively on this original national 2005 database - the synchronic analysis. A different database, to be described below, was used to measure change between measurements - the diachronic analysis. Individual factor scores were computed, and we proceeded with the data analysis.

The three factors that emerged were SK, Intricate, and Fusi. They explained respectively 22.8%, 22.2% and 16.4% of the variance when the factors were rotated to assure orthogonality. How are the dimensions related to these factors and what are the implications of the factors that act as hinges, that is, relate to more than one factor? Table 1 illustrates the results of regressing individual scores by dimensions using the usual criteria of inclusion. It shows that SK is composed of Mutuality and Reciprocity, Political Participation, Civic Participation, Horizontal Relationships, and Hierarchy or Vertical Articulation, and relates negatively to Media and Information and Transparency. The more you place your trust in the media, the less SK you have; and, vice versa, the less SK you have, the more you trust the media. In this same line of argument, and in relation to Fusi and Information and Transparency, the less SK you have, the more isolated you are, and the more likely you are to state that the information received from different sources and for different purposes is sufficient and satisfactory. Just as the first measurement indicated, this indeed confirmed the difficulty of people with a high Fusi score to socially validate information from various public sources.

Table 1 Factors and Their Dimensions; Standardized Regression Coefficients, 2005, National Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Beta 05 SK</th>
<th>Beta 05 Intricate</th>
<th>Beta 05 Fusi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutuality and Reciprocity</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic participation</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal Relationships</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It may be said that SK describes the general condition of society, while Intricate refers to the institutional structure, basically the dimension of Institutional Trust. Intricate, however, is also related to the way institutions are connected to society and the ways the latter has to control them, at least indirectly, that is, the Media and Social Control dimensions. Social Control includes trust in institutions whose purpose is to control government, the knowledge and use of participatory mechanisms to control the State, and the notion of accountability, all of which may or may not be present in the political culture of a specific population. Media and Horizontal Relationships have inverse relationships with SK, a fact that poses interesting questions, especially in regard to Horizontal Relationships: It seems that the higher this form of SK, the less you trust the institutional structure and the less you exert Social Control. In this sense, such SK is distrustful of the institutional sphere and its radius of trust does not extend to the public sphere - a worrisome chasm for the Colombian society.

Finally, two dimensions constitute the nucleus of Fusi: Information and Transparency and Civic Republicanism. Their relation with the factors is one of the most unsettling results. It means that the people who state that they take responsibility for the public sphere are only expressing a belief that they do, without actually engaging in behaviours that enact out the responsibility. This was confirmed by the negative effect on Fusi of the Political Participation and Civic Participation dimensions, which are the actual mechanisms for being part of the public sphere through these specific forms of SK, in other words, through political and civic engagement. These dimensions provide an environment for validating information, thus diminishing the undesirable Fusi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Information and Transparency</th>
<th>Institutional Trust</th>
<th>Social Control</th>
<th>Civic Republicanism</th>
<th>Rsqr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Transparency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Republicanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rsqr</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Measurement of Change in the Factors from 1997 to 2005: Identical Databases and Unstandardized Regression Equations for Territorial Aggregates

For comparison purposes, a new database, with identical elements for the two measures, was constructed from items (with special care for the coding of missing values) to variables and dimensions. As the redesign of the new version of the BARCAS had been done with the precaution of removing only items (and variables) that did not add explanation to the variance, no essential meaning was lost. Several new items introduced in 2005 are thus absent from the comparison, although their averages and impact may be studied directly in the original 2005 database. Table 2 shows the changes in the different dimensions, ordered form those with higher growth to those with greater loss.

Table 2 1997-2005 Averages and Percentage of Change in Dimensions. Identical Databases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity and Mutuality</td>
<td>13.96</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>399%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Transparency</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-3.47</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Republicanism</td>
<td>20.46</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>156.1</td>
<td>129.43</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal Relationships</td>
<td>23.61</td>
<td>19.62</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>30.01</td>
<td>26.71</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Control</td>
<td>49.12</td>
<td>45.28</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>12.85</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Participation</td>
<td>21.94</td>
<td>28.08</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Trust</td>
<td>87.51</td>
<td>121.67</td>
<td>-28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the different absolute magnitude of the dimensions, an unstandardized regression equation was used to compute the average of each factor score for each measurement, and thus determine change. The different regressions were done using as a dependent variable the 2005 individual factor scores for the national sample, as well as the averages of the different dimensions, using the identical data base for the two measurements. The unstandardized regression equation of the form $y = a + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + ...$ for SK is presented as an example in Table 3. The
calculations for each year are presented vertically: First, the average for each dimension \(X_i\); then, the unstandardized coefficients \(b_{ni}\); and finally, the products \(b_{ni}X_i\). These, plus the intersect \((a)\), are added vertically thus arriving at the national value of the factor for each year. The percentage change is obtained by dividing the difference between the 2005 and 1997 scores by the 1997 score. The last column shows the importance of the change in each dimension to the total change in the factors between the two years. For example, for Mutuality and Solidarity \(0.156/0.264 = 59\%\).

### Table 3: The Change in SK 1997-2005 (Equations and Identical Databases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SK 2005</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>B Ks</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>SK1997</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>B Ks</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Difference %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUTUSOLIDARITY</td>
<td>13.96</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>MUTUSOLIDARITY</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL PART.</td>
<td>156.10</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>POLITICAL PART.</td>
<td>129.23</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.0107</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORIZONTAL REL.</td>
<td>23.61</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>HORIZONTAL REL.</td>
<td>19.62</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIERARCHY</td>
<td>30.01</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>HIERARCHY</td>
<td>26.71</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA</td>
<td>12.85</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>MEDIA</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMTRANSP</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>INFORMTRANSP</td>
<td>-3.47</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIC PART.</td>
<td>21.94</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>CIVIC PART.</td>
<td>28.08</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a SK (constant)</td>
<td>-1.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a SK (constant)</td>
<td>-1.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product addition</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.745</td>
<td></td>
<td>Product addition</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.481</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 2005 Score</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ks 1997 Score</td>
<td>-0.249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>106%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We were not interested in computing individual factor scores for the 1997 application, where error could be large, just the average of dimension scores for large populations, where the error would be minimal. These results were computed for each territorial unit under analysis. To maintain crucial analytical consistency, this procedure was used to regress factor scores with variables and then with items, taking the precaution to include in the unstandardized regressions only those (variables or items as deemed necessary) that appeared significant in the regressions of factors with dimensions (or variables, when items were being studied).

### Change Results 1997-2005: SocialK, Intricate, and Fusi

The previous method applied to the different factors indicates that SK increased 106% in the period, Intricate fell 100% and Fusi increased 133%. Regarding the SK rate of increase, the evolution of the
Interpersonal Trust proxy was useful as a benchmark. It increased at a compound rate of 5% in Italy from 1959 to 1990 (8% to 37%, Putnam, 1995). In Colombia, the percentage increased from 10.1% to 14.3% - a compound increase of 4.48% a year - indeed a very good rate of growth. Just to speculate on a hypothetical benchmark of future progress, if this rate were maintained to 2019, the bicentennial of Colombia’s Independence, Interpersonal Trust would rise to 28.33%, the level of South Korea in 2005 and Mexico in 1998. The change in perception of corruption - an element more related to the Intricate factor - was nil.

The SK increase was produced mainly (Table 3, last column: % difference) by the Mutuality and Reciprocity dimension, with Political Participation a close second, and to a lesser proportion by Horizontal Relationships, Hierarchy or Vertical Articulation, and Media (a fall in the latter causes an increase in SK). SK was lowered by the growth of Information and Transparency, which increases Fusi, and the drop in Civic Participation, whose average fell 22%. Had Civic Participation been maintained at the 1997 level, SK would have increased 143% instead of the actual 106%.

The dramatic drop in Intricate was due almost exclusively to the fall of Institutional Trust (from 122 to 88) and to a lesser degree, by the fall of trust and activities in Media. The negative effect of the increase in Horizontal Relationships was marginal. Social Control (especially participatory mechanisms for controlling government and accountability) was the only dimension whose increase managed to neutralize the fall in Intricate, even if only to a small degree. Within Intricate, the only items that did not fall were trust in the national government, with a 13% increase (to 4.38), and trust in the municipal government, which did not change (4.25). Despite being in the extreme low range, trust in guerrillas (0.46) and self defense organizations (0.65) showed the largest fall (57% and 65%, respectively). To give a sense of range and scale, trust in church, congress, and political parties fell to 7.39, 2.88, and 2.37, respectively. In the Social Control dimension, and also contributing the SK increase, were the Veedurías (oversight citizen groups), the participatory mechanism with the largest positive impact on Intricate. It is here that we see how SK flows into Intricate and society links with the institutional structure. The effect is not restricted to the Veedurías; in their absence, their relation to other participatory mechanisms reappears in other regressions.
The increase in Fusi is as disturbing as the decrease in Intricate. The changes were due mostly to the growth in Information and Transparency (the nucleus of Fusi) and to the belief that citizens assume responsibility for public matters (Civic Republicanism). On the other hand, the loss in Civic Participation made Fusi increase, since membership in secular VOIs decreased; these social settings, where information can be validated, were lost for many. The increase in Political Participation barely compensated for the drop in Civic Participation. As we will see when the results in the most important Colombian cities are discussed, a drastic fall in Fusi is fundamental for a cultural and political change by which people acknowledge the problematic political reality in which they live and consider its change. Nevertheless, we will see that a fall in Fusi is only one element in a complex transformational equation.

The Disaggregation of Dimensions and Their Impact on the Change in Factors

The emergence of the three factors and the divergent ways of their change adds complexity to the analysis. Simple formulas or assumptions about SK do not delve into the intricacy of the conceptual space measured, so a more clinical, case-specific approach is necessary. Let us proceed with the disaggregation into variables and items in order to understand the composition and transformation of factors at the national level. The addition of the results for cities will help to interpret the pattern that emerged surrounding the fall of Fusi.

As was already pointed, Mutuality and Reciprocity contributed the most to the increase in SK. Within it, we found a significant recovery in general solidarity (conspicuously, help by government and charity/humanitarian organizations), an increase in reciprocity, and a decrease in opportunism. Due especially to the increase in the percentage of people who do not belong to any secular or religious VO, atomization grew. Cali was the only city in which this dimension remained unchanged, while Bogotá and Barranquilla exhibited the largest increase. This dimension, however, does not link SK to the other two factors.
Political Participation contributed noticeably to the increase in SK and had a smaller, yet significant, impact on the decrease of Fusi. Voting, its most conventional indicator, grew considerably. Here, Medellin showed important progress, especially when considering the number of people who claimed they could not vote in 1997 (56%, compared to 2% in 2005). Nationally, political skills grew, as well as the use and knowledge of participatory mechanisms, the essence of a participatory democracy. Nonetheless, legislative linkage, the essence of a representative democracy (asked of each legislative body: Did you vote? Do you know who your representative would have been? Was he elected? and Who you think can represent you the best?) suffered a general loss, except in Medellin, where the municipal government instituted an annual locality (commune) participatory budget. A 1 to 10 scale was employed for each in order to evaluate the knowledge and utilization of participatory mechanisms. If the mechanism was unknown, 0 points were given; if it was known but the respondent did not know anyone who had used it, a 5 point score was given; if both conditions were achieved, a 10 point score was assigned. As to the knowledge and utilization of participatory mechanisms, the results were very positive: While in 1997, 27.9% of the population knew of no mechanism aside from Tutela², the 2005 percentage fell to 18.8%. A detailed analysis of results is not possible here; let us suffice with the example of the Territorial Planning Councils (a constitutional mechanism by which various organized interests are represented and scrutinize each territorial development plan), which had the largest increase (117%). However, 70% of the population over 18 still does not know about them. At last count (2008), 45% of the municipalities had approved their four year development plan without consulting with these non-operative bodies.

As said repeatedly, the most influential variable in Civic Participation is membership in secular VOs (density), whether active (10), inactive (5) or non-existent (0). The percentage of the population not belonging to any secular VO rose from 42% in 1997 to 58% in 2005. For the eight years between measurements, we have a 4% annual loss: a hemorrhage of SK and a torrent of Fusi. Only agrarian organizations grew; political parties fell the most. Volunteer work, another dimension variable, fell 25%, barely covering 36% of the population, while in 1997 it covered 48%.

Horizontal Relationships increased mainly due to horizontal solidarity and horizontal solutions to collective problems. Hierarchy or Vertical Articulation increased only slightly. Nevertheless, every
center-periphery mediating organization (churches, guilds, unions and political parties) suffered a decrease both in density and trust, thus aggravating the problem of governability - already considered critical in 1997 – and leaving an increased clientelism as its main articulating mechanism. Due to the simultaneous loss in religious and secular VO segments, the fall in church membership did not alter Colombia’s very low VO secularism (see Figure 1), which in 1997 was only surpassed by Nigeria and above South Africa in the ratio of active religious to total active membership in VOs.

The Meaning of the Increase in Faith in Unvalidated Sources of Information

The increase in Fusi indicates a loss of information validation instances and poses a serious problem for Colombian society. Although reaching the secondary education threshold is considered to affect cognitive mobilization positively, the 1997 measurement showed that its effect had disappeared, thus indicating that the rise in Fusi had to have a broader cause. People delegate their public responsibilities and float into the realm of belief instead of validating the information they receive. Fusi’s interpretation is counterintuitive: all that seems desirable, especially a positive appreciation of information received from different sources of information, reflects only faith, a belief in that which we do not see. The same is true of Civic Republicanism and its troublesome increase. And this poses a new problem: If the world described by a high Fusi is a myth, is it possible to ask about the set of realities that are valid, that is, the items that decrease Fusi? Though these might not be normatively desirable, they offer a more objective description of what is taking place. Since the logic implicit here is quite complex, special care must be exercised.

Regarding Civic Republicanism, the growth in the political education and politicization of citizenship variables contributed to the rise in Fusi. Particularism increased Fusi as its average fell. Clientelism, however, whose average grew, shrunk Fusi. Responsibility for the success of the public sphere (How much responsibility do you take for the educational systems, the municipal government, etc.), with all its items declining, diminished Fusi the most. This result indicates a citizen demobilization from the public sphere where the recognition that no responsibility is taken is a better description of ‘reality’ than the opposite statement. In other words, those who claim that
they assume responsibility for public matters in their diverse environments are simply stating so, without actually engaging in civic and political activities. This result, together with those of the remaining Civic Republicanism variables, indicates that the set of statements implicit in Civic Republicanism (also related to SK in 1997) ceased to be an active and true polar opposite of clientelism and split from SK to become an ideology, a set of beliefs or opinions about what citizens do. This brings us back to the question about the realities that better describe the facts and lower Fusi. The BARCAS list of items that lower Fusi is quite troublesome. It describes a world in which neither political parties nor the government provide information and tools for citizens to guide their actions, people make an effort to participate and exercise public functions only when they are paid for to do so, clientelism becomes a more frequent realistic solution to collective problems, political connections are more effective for obtaining help and finally, citizens do not assume responsibility for the success of public matters, especially government. This evidence, together with the loss of Civic Participation, confirms what has been already argued: that the citizenry demobilized from the public sphere compared to its 1997 position. Though an electoral mobilization (voting) did take place, citizen responsibilities ended there, just as was prescribed prior to the 1991 Constitution. Let us recall that although voting increased SK, it did not increase Intricate nor diminish Fusi. The sense of co-responsibility for the public good did not hold for long.

This discussion establishes a conceptually complex problem: Although the ‘realities’ described are a better reflection of the world, this does not mean that they are normatively desirable. This world would have to be changed, though not just ideologically. As we shall soon see, a drastic reduction of Fusi is indispensable for a change to a political culture driven by an active citizenry that keeps governments and representatives accountable and requires a process of heightened awareness akin to cognitive mobilization: a collective self-confession (CSC). Notwithstanding the downturn of Fusi in Medellín, the BARCAS indicated that the level of public responsibility is still very low and an obstacle to the city’s civic development. A low Fusi, however, should not be a relief from the lack of a modern civic society; it is only a respite constituted by the fact that at least citizens are not tricked by a civic fantasy where everything is all right and thus feel comfortable in their passivity.
The Absence of Government Policies for Counteracting the Decline of Civic Society and Enhancing Citizen Participation

One of paradoxes of development is that, even if a strong civil society accelerates economic development (Putnam, 1993), it has a tendency to destroy it (Sudarsky, 2001). Hence, a systematic effort is required from the government to promote civil society, especially from one that claims to encourage participation. As has been discussed, membership in secular VOs (the simplest definition of civil society) fell, destroying SK and one of the most important mechanisms of social validation of information in the process. Is this loss a global trend? Figure 1 makes it clear that the downfall of active membership in Colombia is one of the world's severest.

![Figure 1 Change in Aggregated Active Membership in Nine Organizations (Church, Sports or Social Clubs, Artistic Musical and/or Educational, Unions, Political Parties, Ecological, Professional Chamber or Guild, Charity, and Others) 2005/1998. Source: WVS](image)
It is worth pointing out that India, at the same level as Colombia in 1997 (Sudarsky, 2001: 195) showed the greatest advance in active volunteer membership, surpassing Colombia by 140% in the brief time span between the two measurements.

The fall in legislative linkage and civic demobilization and the rapid economic growth could lead us to look for the culprit in the citizens themselves. However, it is the government’s responsibility to build citizenship and structure spaces for public involvement. What was found instead was that between 1997 and 2005 some of the most effective participatory mechanisms, such as those in education and health, exhibited little growth or even a loss. The government’s policy for participation concentrates all its efforts on the Consejos Comunales (communal councils), during which the President and his ministers meet to discuss problems and solve them directly. Fifty percent of the population knows about these councils; 23% know someone who has attended them. Since the citizens are summoned directly, the councils de-institutionalize participatory mechanisms and civic organizations and render legitimacy only to the national government (see the results of the Intricate factor). The councils become instruments of government, definitely not of social control of society over the State.

Civil society must not be left adrift. Governments and states should structure instrumental civic organizations for civic participation and not just shift into a policy of benign neglect. This policy concern goes against the much held theory that governments have nothing to do with this sphere. Historical evidence indicates that governments and states do well in creating articulated participatory structures where volunteer organizations can come together and citizens find channels for mobilization. The discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper (See Eisenstadt, 2003, Skocpol, 2003, and Putnam, 2002 for the case of England) and is still waiting for systematic and comparative treatment, especially since the fear of state corporatism (Schmitter, 1977) - so frequently used ideologically in Latin America as a scare tactic against public representation of interests - has been assuaged. In 1997, Colombia was the country in the WVS sample where the combined membership in unions and guilds was the lowest. And since, membership has fallen even further.
Without an organized civil society, development creates a fragmented mass of loose individuals unable to articulate themselves either with the center or the regions. Just as the measurements indicate, the concept of mobilizing citizens is complicated both by the results in civic participation and the citizen myth. Understanding that secular volunteer organizations and their activities require institutionalization is of utmost importance. The volatile and restless attention of citizens is quite feeble when compared to a volunteer organization’s institutionalized search of an objective. Avritzer (2002) states that this structure of mobilization and institutionalizations is what citizens should be struggling to construct in the current Third Wave of Democracy. In Colombia, the process is in a flux (Velasquez, 2008), but regarding the structuring of this policy during President Uribe’s administrations, the outcomes are negative. To begin with, the notion of civil society itself is absent from its ideological imagery. Neither in its long-term view (National Planning Office, 2005) nor in its two four-year National Development Plans (2002-2006 and 2006-2010) is there a single reference to civil society. Additionally, the governmental institutional structure, formerly available and meant to establish and coordinate articulated participatory policies, was dismantled when the Interior and Justice ministries were merged in 2003. All efforts are concentrated on the Consejos Comunales, bypassing and undermining civil society’s organizations.

It is clear that a policy for stimulating the development of civil society and its articulation with the institutional structure through participatory mechanisms must offer citizens some instrumentality. The results in several cities allow us to illustrate a process of change and posit a theory of transformation of political culture into a desirable factor pattern.

**Evidence from Changes in Major Colombian Cities Regarding the Transition towards Modern Civic Society**

Due to the impact of political change and various paramilitary, guerrillas, drug trafficking and military interventions, the regional results of the measurement exhibit great diversity and volatility in factor patterns and change. Space does not allow for even a sketchy elaboration. However, the distinct pattern of transformation emerging in the main cities (Barranquilla, Cali, Medellin and Bogotá) requires detailed attention since it should lead to a MCS. It begins with a drop of Fusi through the
process we have called (1) Collective Self-Confession (CSC), by which citizens problematize the clientelistic and corrupt political culture in which they live, cease to have faith in various sources of information, and recognize that they are not taking responsibility for the public good. The process could be utilized by a municipal administration to advance towards a MCS. For this to happen, it is necessary to construct (2), socially, administratively, and politically, intermediate containers between city and neighborhoods capable of accumulating SK. These aggregations (localities, communes) could acquire more responsibilities through processes of (3) decentralization and, critically, by introducing deliberative participatory mechanisms such as participatory planning of public local investment and projects and, even better, because of their annual frequency, participatory budgeting. As their capacities mature, the processes should receive incremental percentages of municipal income. This structure should lead to (4) the mobilization of a civil society whose density would grow if governments (national, departmental, and municipal) offer an (5) articulated structure of participation that induces citizens to become members of volunteer organizations. The participatory planning and budgeting should build (6) collective rationality so as not to become another mechanism of clientelism nor demand inflation by the citizens, which could lead to a fiscal crisis³. To generate such rationality, the mechanisms should become a process of allocation of limited resources, a zero-sum game that forces citizens to make the choices that are generally made in private by the legislature, destroying trust and legitimacy. Finally, to establish mechanisms of accountability, localities (7) should eventually become single-seat electoral districts for people to know who their representative is and make him accountable. As this is politically difficult in Latin American countries where electoral systems are designed to obscure the public identification of a territory’s representative (Crisp, Moreno and Shugart, 2003; Sudarsky, 2009), political maps would have to be built for establishing the electoral importance of a representative for the locality and the importance of the locality to the representative, resulting in a two-way, public linkage between representative and territory.

Results from Four Colombian Cities, 1997-2005
The results from the four cities studied provide some evidence for the above set of statements. Barranquilla is the only city where a collective self-confession had not taken place, and as seen in Figure 2, Fusi increased there more than in the country as a whole. Though SK did increase, mainly in Mutuality and Solidarity, it did not spill into the public sphere. In contrast to the national increase in Social Control, political participation did not grow as much (less voting, less legislative linkage), civic participation fell, and 70% of the population did not belong to any secular VO. Social Control fell, especially because of the decrease in participation in Veedurías and Territorial Planning Councils, and was affected by the low level of accountability in Barranquilla’s political culture. Despite the fact that localities had been legally established (they elect ediles – locality councilmen), they had not been developed either as administrative units or local participatory mechanisms, postponed by the increasing corruption and mafia penetration of a backbreaking fiscal crisis. Dramatically, Interpersonal Trust fell and perception of corruption increased between the two measurements.

![Factor Level (Equations) 1997/2005](image)

*Figure 2: Factors 1997-2005 Four major cities (Sudarsky, 2008)*

In Cali, collective self-confession took place recently, as evidenced by the loss of Fusi. The growth of SK was small, especially because Solidarity and Mutuality, contrary to the national trend, remained stable and low. The city shows a retreat from the public sphere with low levels of political
participation and linkage and a dramatic decrease in secular VO membership. Horizontal Relationships did grow, but only as a reflection of a drastic downfall in Intricate and the rift between the citizenry and the institutional structure, the product of the disenchantment with the popularly elected mayor’s performance and corruption, which turned into a rebuff of the institutional structure. Horizontal Relationships constitute a hiding place that offers some solace from the frustration with the institutional scaffolding. The lack of local structures, dismantled at the first sight of a fiscal crisis triggered by the corruption of previous years, made unavailable the information necessary for using social control mechanisms, in spite of which the ideological concept of accountability faintly remains in the city’s political culture.

Medellín, where a civic mayor was elected and a large-scale nationally sponsored process of paramilitary demobilization and reinsertion was carried out, is an especially interesting case. A CSC took place close to the second measurement and was accompanied by the largest absolute territorial increase in SK, yet still at the lowest level of all cities studied. A great deal of SK remains to be constructed, especially by finding non-opportunistic ways to solve collective problems and structured settings for doing so. Political participation had the largest increase with the already mentioned rise in voting. Legislative linkage in the city and local councils grew considerably, a clear product of local participatory budgeting and the general increase of participatory mechanisms, especially in education, the mayor’s flagship policy. Civic Participation suffered a noticeable decrease, highlighting the problem that Medellín citizens delegate the responsibility of public matters to the institutional structure, leaving participatory settings, particularly neighborhoods, devoid of SK. Medellin is advancing in the right direction, but still has a long road ahead, especially concerning citizen responsibility for the public sphere.

At the time of the 1997 measurement, a CSC process had already taken place in Bogotá as had been evidenced by the lowest Fusi level of the four cities. By 2001, local participatory planning has been instituted and a succession of mayors had presided over a city-wide transformation whereby social programs achieved a reverse and fall in atomization, although not in VO membership, which actually fell. Yet despite the decrease of membership in secular VOs, there were glimpses of
sustained, articulated participatory structures in localities such as Antonio Nariño and sectors such as culture (Sudarsky, 2003, 2008). Unfortunately, the 2004 local participatory planning was not constructed with the creation of collective rationality in mind, nor as a zero-sum exercise, but by making sure ‘everyone received more or less what they wanted.’ Legislative linkage at the local level did not increase, which helps to compare the effects of participatory planning every four years with Medellin’s yearly participatory budgeting.

**Final Remarks**

The results have several implications both for substantive issues of SK and the methodology of its measurement. Concerning the former, the three factors add complexity to the ever-growing literature on SK, and their full repercussions will have to be studied over time, among them, and just to mention a few, the differentiation between SK proper and the institutional structure, frequently fused into one. The simultaneous effects of Horizontal Relations, positive in SK and negative in Intricate, pose problems that would have to be validated in other societies where the commitment to and the legitimacy of institutional structures are different. The role of deliberative mechanisms in countries where the relationship between political representation and the possibility of accountability is not as drastically broken as in Latin America could be less important. The appearance of Fusi as a factor also introduces new problems, especially since the role of information exchange and SK indicate that this is a central function of the latter (Balestro, 2006). This also highlights that the problem of information is not always its public offer, its supply, but instead the structuring of information-consuming audiences (i.e. civic organizations). Here, for example, new information exchange mechanisms such as the Internet - the only news source that lowered Fusi - are interesting. On the other hand, the examples of positive change provided glimpses of what can purposively be done with appropriate policies and practices. Nevertheless, the general results evidence the volatility of the factors that are probably less volatile in other less turbulent societies where the accumulated SK and the other factors have a greater positive mass, less amenable to the large disturbances seen in Colombia. The specifics of public policies and state structures that promote participation and the development of civic society are additional subjects for systematic
comparative research that could lead us to ponder on the application of instruments similar to BARCAS in a wide range of societies. If variations are so wide within a single society acknowledged to be in the low SK range, what may we see in societies with different cultural traditions, for example, the ones illustrated by WVS value patterns and factors?

Returning to the methodological issues, the BARCAS, especially its capacity to aggregate and disaggregate results into variables and items, proved to be a precise enough instrument to measure the empirical space studied, as well as its complexity. The BARCAS strikes a good balance between the external and face validity of some of its results and the discovery of previously unknown and quite surprising social phenomena. It also constitutes an example of the kind of measurements developing countries need to make in order to be less controlled by their culture and understand the workings of their societies, instead of simply depending on piecemeal anthropological research projects and unreliable surveys that are too fractioned and from which it is difficult to generalize. The clinical approach of the BARCAS, with its capacity to cut deep into the complexities and variety of the empirical space measured, also raises doubts about the most current research strategy in the social sciences: that of examining relationships between two or more variables - perhaps in several countries - and trying to generalize from them. Obviously, there should be different versions of the BARCAS for different countries and cultural blocks and, perhaps, the WVS could be used as a template. In the attempt to reconstruct the results of the factors from the specific WVS survey, we obtained a satisfactory level of explained variance for Intricate (80%), less for SK (46%), and low for Fusi (13%). Yet, while respecting the survey’s priceless integrity, complete series of questions would have to be added.

Notes
The second measurement was carried under the institutional umbrella of the Fundación Restrepo Barco and received contributions from Colciencias (Ref.097, 2005), the National Planning Office, ECOPETROL, the Bogotá and Medellín mayor’s offices, Confandi, the Chamber of Commerce and Confenalco (in Cali), and Barranquilla’s Promigas Foundation.

Tutela: The constitutional option of filing a claim with a judge for the immediate fulfilment of a fundamental right that has been allegedly denied.

Strom et al. (2003) study electoral systems and the mechanisms for preventing agency loss between citizens and representatives and classify these mechanisms as ex ante and ex post elections. Participatory mechanisms can be seen in this light, especially participatory planning and budgeting, which solve an additional crucial problem: elected officers would know what their constituency wants. ‘All surveys indicate that citizens want more services and less taxes,’ precisely the problem of zero sum.

ACCOUNTABILITY

In voting for a candidate, the least important reasons are the priorities he establishes in his program. Reason to Vote: Content of ProgramKnowing where public funds from locality/region are investedAfter a public decision is made, people strictly watch what happens with it. Reason to Vote: Fulfilment of promises Participatory Mechanism: Recall

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